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CHAPTER 3
Institutions, Social Networks, 
and Conﬂicts in Guinea-Bissau
Results from a 2005 Survey
Estanislao Gacitua-Mario, Sigrun Aasland, Hakon Nordang, and Quentin Wodon8
Guinea-Bissau endured a major conﬂict in 1998 and has suffered from persistent
political instability since independence. After a brief review of indicators of
governance in Guinea-Bissau and recent political developments, the objective of
this Chapter is to provide results from a recent survey that gives insights into
the opinions of the population, among others, about changes in well-being over
time, trust in various institutions, sources of conﬂicts at the local level, and
ways to deal with conﬂicts. There is a clear perception among citizens that
there has been a decline in well-being as a result of the conﬂict, as well as a
lack of improvement since then, at least for those in poverty who are highly
vulnerable. The data suggest an increase in the lack of security after the conﬂict
and no clear sign of improvement. The population has little trust in national
institutions such as the army, the police, the judicial system, and the central
government. Local conﬂicts often emerge because of the competition for scarce
productive resources, but poorer households deal with these conﬂicts differently
than wealthier households.
Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the HDIindex the country is ranked 172nd (among 177) in the 2004 Human Develop-ment Report (UNDP 2004). It is estimated that 65.7 percent of the population
live in poverty and 21.6 percent in extreme poverty. Guinea-Bissau’s economy is based on
farming and fishing, which represent about 63 percent of GDP. The agricultural sector
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Lourenço-Lindell for sharing research on livelihoods in Guinea-Bissau.
generates 80 percent of the employment, and contributes about 50 percent to the PIB and
90 percent of exports (through cashew nuts, essentially). The ofﬁcial development assistance
received represents a very large share of the gross national income.
Since its independence from Portugal in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has been characterized
by the increasing isolation of state bureaucracies and continuing political disarray. Gov-
ernance has suffered from a gap between state and civil society, which marked the transi-
tion from colonial administration to independent democratic rule (Forrest 2003). As a
result, public administration has been characterized by hypertrophy, disorganization of
its components, and incapacity to fulﬁll its functions and provide public services. After
independence, the country was ruled under a one-party system. The ﬁrst multiparty elections
were held in 1994. Nevertheless, even after those elections, political leadership used author-
itarian strategies to hold on to power and internal divisions led to growing factionalism
and institutional paralysis.
The persistence of political instability has arisen in part because of social fragmentation.
The population is highly diverse. The country has more than 20 different ethnic groups, with
no group having an absolute majority. The ﬁve largest ethnic groups are Balanta (28 percent),
Fula (23 percent), Mandinga (13 percent), Manjaco (11 percent), and Pepel (7 percent). The
other 15 or so ethnic groups represent about 18 percent of the population. The urban/rural
distribution of the groups suggests that Balanta and Pepel are more concentrated in rural
areas, whereas the Manjaco, Fula, and Mandinga tend to reside in urban areas. Most of
the population is Muslim (40 percent)—mainly drawn from the Eastern groups, such as
the Fula and Mandinga—or Animist (37 percent), followed by Catholic (17 percent), and
other religions (6 percent). In general, different stakeholders, such as various political forces,
ethnic groups, and the military have evolved into a closed network isolated from each other.
The pursuit of politicized and/or personalized interests without a clear strategic focus
contradicts popular interests.
Eventually, an army uprising in 1998 led to the president’s ouster and a civil war. After
the signing of a peace agreement, presidential elections were held in 2000. In September
2003, a coup took place and a transitional national government was appointed. Parlia-
mentary elections were held in March 2004, and, in October of the same year, an army
mutiny resulted in the killing of the chief of staff. Despite some stabilization in 2005, the
political situation is still volatile and the elections that took place on June 19, 2005, will not
necessarily ensure stability and lead to an improvement of the living conditions of the poor
and vulnerable. In short, Guinea-Bissau is still a country in which political instability and
lack of progress in governance contribute to the deterioration of potential economic and
social opportunities.9
The main objective of this chapter is to provide the results from a recent small-scale
household survey that gives insights into the opinions of the population about changes in
its level of well-being over time, its trust in various local and national authorities, sources
of conﬂicts at the local level, and ways with which the population deals with these conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst section provides a general background on the current state of governance as mea-
sured by various indicators and recent political developments. The detailed results from
the analysis are provided in the second section. A brief conclusion follows.
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Governance and Recent Political Developments: A Brief Review
Indicators of Governance: International Comparisons
Institutions in Guinea-Bissau are characterized by a persistent tension that exist between for-
mal and informal institutions as well as community-based (rural) and state-based organiza-
tions (Forrest 2003). The result of this fragility is that most institutions do not respond to the
public interest in an efﬁcient, effective, and fair way. This disarray, as well as poor institu-
tional capacity, is further exacerbated by corruption (Government of Guinea-Bissau 2002).
While in some indicators of governance and accountability, Guinea-Bissau performs
close to the average for Sub-Saharan countries (see Figure 3.1), rule of law and government
effectiveness are among the lowest in the region. Most state institutions have been unable
to generate or command long-term loyalties. This is partly explained by their lack of capac-
ity to deliver services and beneﬁts. In addition, social and political leaders have established
strong paternalistic relationships with their constituencies without reaching out or bridg-
ing to other social groups, and thereby without building broader coalitions or strength-
ening the legitimacy of the existing state institutions. In the absence of strong state
institutions, the population has strengthened their local networks and has learned how to
count on their own forces to search for solutions to their problems. Local institutions
(from neighborhood associations to the local schools and the traditional authorities) there-
fore perform many functions (mutual help, leisure, collective security, conﬂict resolution,
and so on), some of which could be handled by the state.
The consequences of the 1998 conﬂict are still reﬂected across the country in the dam-
aged infrastructure as well as in the weak public sector, existing insecurity, political insta-
bility, and crime. Again, while at the local level communities work together to resolve some
immediate problems, the capacity to work together beyond the local dimension and to
resolve differences in Guinea-Bissau is poor. Political risks and ethnic tensions are building
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Figure 3.1 Selected Governance and Accountability Indicators, 2004
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up. Over the past 10 years, there has been an increasing politicization of ethnicity, which
has been conveniently used by self-serving leaders seeking to increase their legitimacy and
power. As shown in Table 3.1, overall risk rating for Guinea-Bissau (according to the
International Country Risk Guide database) is below the average for Sub-Saharan countries.
Thus, existing indicators suggest that there is a weak sense of public institutions and
nation-state building in Guinea-Bissau. The accountability of formal institutions is rather
limited and cohesion is poor. Social capital functions at the local level to establish networks
that contribute to achieve discrete goals of various population groups, helping to provide
services and support livelihoods. Within those networks, accountability is higher and
reﬂects the paternalistic nature of the relationships between local leadership and the com-
munity or groups for which these leaders act as protectors, and hinges on intermediaries
with larger social institutions. However, public institutions are not effective at the national
level and have failed to gain public credibility. At the same time there is an increased frac-
ture or disarticulation between national level institutions and leaderships and local com-
munities and their authorities.
As stressed in Chapter 1,10 it is important to realize that weaknesses in governance have
impacts on the strategic management of key sectors of the economy. This can be illustrated
through the case of the ﬁshing sector. The sector’s governance is constrained by its weak
regulatory and legal framework, low institutional capacity, and modest qualiﬁed human
resources. In terms of ofﬁcial policies, Guinea-Bissau has not had a coherent set of sector
objectives since the ﬁsheries management plan prepared in 1996. In the mid-1990s, the
USAID-funded Trade and Investment Promotion Services (TIPS) program provided rec-
ommendations to the ministry of fisheries that led to the creation of annual fisheries
management plans. The plans also included long-term programs aimed at moving the “off-
shore” industrial ﬁshery gradually onshore. Since then, Guinea-Bissau has not developed
ofﬁcial ﬁsheries management plans or a coherent policy for the sector.
In practice, the ﬁsheries sector policies of Guinea-Bissau have focused exclusively on
maximizing public ﬁnancial beneﬁts from the sector (through ﬁshing licenses and com-
pensations collected from mainly foreign ﬂeets and governments). Monitoring, control,
and supervision (MCS); development of artisanal ﬁsheries; and maintaining and improv-
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Average
Government Internal Military Religious Ethnic risk
stability conﬂicts politics tensions tensions rating
Guinea-Bissau 5.5 7.0 1.5 5.0 3.0 52.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.9 8.5 2.5 4.1 3.2 56.2
Somalia (worst) 7.0 4.5 1.0 3.0 2.0 26.0
Botswana (best) 11.0 10.5 6.0 5.0 4.5 78.5
Table 3.1 Selected ICGR Indicators of Cohesion in 2005
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Available at http://www.icrgonline.com.
10. Acemoglu (2003 and 2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a, 2006b), and Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2002), Fosu (2001), and Rodrick (1999).
ing existing infrastructure have been lesser objectives, and have been largely unattainable
given the institutional and ﬁnancial constraints that the sector and the country face.
However, this heavy reliance of the government on ﬁsheries sector revenues under-
scores both the importance and difﬁculty of strengthening the governance of the sector.
This reliance undermines the bargaining power and negotiating options of the government
vis-à-vis foreign governments seeking access agreements, potentially reducing the overall
environmental and social benefits to the country of such agreements. Another equally
important aspect of this dependence relates to the country’s capacity and systems to collect,
handle, allocate, and use natural resource rents for poverty reduction and social cohesion
purposes. Given past concerns and allegations about corruption, attention toward strength-
ening mechanisms and systems for ﬁscal transparency and accountability is required.
Recent Political Developments
The recent presidential election that took place in June and July 2005 was meant to end the
transitional arrangements that had been put in place since the ousting of former president
Kumba Yala in September 2003. It was also meant to put an end to the postconﬂict transi-
tion that began after the civil war of 1998–9 and bring a return to constitutional and demo-
cratic rule in Guinea-Bissau following years of political instability and administrative chaos.
Some 22 presidential candidates, drawn from as many political parties, contested the
first round of elections held on June 19, 2005. The three front-runners were all former
presidents—João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, previously the head of the ruling African Party
for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), who as the former mil-
itary ruler and the country’s ﬁrst democratically elected president ruled the country from
1980 when he seized power through a coup against then president Luis Cabral, until 1999
when he was ousted because of clashes with the Army; Malam Bacai Sanhá, the PAIGC’s
ofﬁcial presidential candidate, who was the interim president following Vieira’s departure;
and Kumba Yala of the Partido de Renovação Social (PRS), who was the democratically
elected president between 2000 and September 2003 until he was toppled through a blood-
less coup.
Sanhá and Vieira headed to the second round, with Yala, the third-place candidate in
the ﬁrst round, declaring on July 2, 2005, that he would support the candidacy of Nino
Vieira. With the backing of Kumba Yala—who is from the largest ethnic group comprising
more than 30 percent of the population, the Balanta, and who is claimed to have the sup-
port and loyalty of key ﬁgures within the Army—Nino Vieira went on to win the second
set of elections held on July 26, 2005. On July 28, 2005, the electoral commission, Com-
missão Nacional de Eleições (CNE), announced the victory of Nino Vieira, who had just
returned to Guinea-Bissau after six years in exile in Portugal where he had been forced to
ﬂee because of indictments for corruption and human rights abuses during his 19-year-
long rule of Guinea-Bissau. Nino Vieira won narrowly, receiving 52.4 percent of the vote,
a little over 19,000 votes more than Sanhá. Rivals clashed in the capital shortly following
the announcement, and Sanhá, the runner-up, and the ruling PAIGC, rejected the results
by claiming electoral fraud11 and referred the case ﬁrst to the CNE for a recount and later
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11. PAIGC rejected the results because of alleged electoral fraud, including the voting of foreigners in
Gabu, Bafatá, and Quínara and the use of lists with unregistered voters.
to the supreme court.12 Although some minor voting irregularities allegedly occurred,
international monitors13 declared the elections as free, fair, and transparent.
Nevertheless, the run-up to the elections and the period between the ﬁrst and second
rounds of voting was marred by fear and uncertainty. In May 2005, Kumba Yala, arguing
that his own ousting from power in 2003 had been illegal, claimed he was still president
and threatened to take power by other means. He backed his words up with action when
he, together with a group of armed men, stormed the presidential palace for a few hours.
Closer to the second round of elections, on July 17, 2005, two police ofﬁcers died and 
10 others were injured when armed men attempted to attack the presidential palace and
the ministry of interior. This was allegedly carried out by supporters of the PRS and appears
to have been motivated by the desire to avenge the death of four PRS supporters at a
demonstration in June (EIU 2005). The attack reﬂects a general pattern of violent actions
that have defined politics in Guinea-Bissau, particularly since the civil war in 1998–9.
Moreover, following the dismissal by the supreme court of the challenge by the PAIGC,
the political climate has been characterized by political paralysis which was only recently
resolved when the current prime minister, Carlos Gomes Júnior, also of the PAIGC,
ﬁnally decided to accept the results of the presidential elections.
The presidential inauguration ﬁnally took place on October 1, 2005, more than two
months after the presidential elections, after a month-long delay orchestrated by the ruling
party and the prime minister, who refused to recognize Vieira’s electoral victory. While the
ceremony itself went smoothly, the inauguration was marked by fear, amidst rumors—
published by Senegalese newspaper Wal Fadjri—that a small group of soldiers had attacked
a police station in Farim, in the Oio region, with the apparent intention of disrupting the
inauguration. Moreover, none of the 19 heads of state invited to attend Vieira’s swearing-
in ceremony attended, heavily armed soldiers patrolled the streets, and many of the coun-
try’s leading politicians—including the presidential runner-up, Sanhá—stayed home,
raising fears of a return to years of instability.
President Vieira, however, aware that the legacy of his rule from 1980 to 1999 had
made his re-election controversial and divisive has, so far, tried to counter these fears by
continuing his electoral campaign mantra of reconciliation and national unity, promising
to uphold the law, modernize the economy, defend freedom of expression, and reform the
army. He has also conﬁrmed that he is willing to cooperate with the current government
and the prime minister, despite the ruling party’s previous attempt to have his victory
annulled. Vieira also seems to have gained the support of the military, with Armed Forces
chief of staff Baptista Tagme Na Wai, and Navy chief of staff Bubo Na Tchuto, and Aniceto
Na Fla, all pledging their support to the country’s democratically elected civilian leaders.
Nevertheless, the return to electoral democratic rule still leaves many issues unresolved
which will continue to plague the political situation in Guinea-Bissau. Ultimately, many
of the causes underlying the political instability and insecurity which has deﬁned Guinea-
Bissau during the last seven to eight years remain.
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had taken place outside the timeframe established by law.
13. International monitors included groups from the European Union, the African Union, the United
States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Comunidade dos Países de
Língua Portuguesa (CEPAL).
An immediate cause for concern relates to the current constellation of, and competi-
tion for, power between the executive and the legislative. Although the immediate dispute
between Vieira and the PAIGC has been overcome, tensions between the president and the
prime minister will surely remain—as a political analyst recently remarked, “with Gomes
seeking to limit Vieira’s powers and prerogatives, and Vieira seeking to undermine the pre-
mier’s position within the PAIGC—the party Vieira once led.”14 This situation has been
further complicated during the electoral campaign by an increasingly visible split within
the PAIGC, between, on the one hand, its leadership, many of whom refused to recognize
Vieira’s victory and insisting the ofﬁcial PAIGC candidate Sanhá was the rightful winner,
and, on the other hand, other party members—mainly drawn from the “old guard” who
are still committed to their old party leader.
So far, it seems Vieira has the upper hand. With the backing of Kumba Yala—who
Gomes Júnior has suggested may have been promised the role of prime minister in a new
government in return for his support during the electoral campaign—Vieira has quickly
moved to cement his own position and inﬂuence within the armed forces by conﬁrming
the reappointment of Armed Forces chief of staff Gen. Wai, who fought alongside Vieira
during the anticolonial struggle but who also belongs to the Balanta ethnic group. More-
over, it is also within Vieira’s powers to form a new government immediately or to call early
elections in a few months time, which could undermine the role and relative power of the
ruling PAIGC and the current prime minister.
Already there seems to be some evidence that the new president is moving to consol-
idate power, by insisting that he, instead of the prime minister, will now preside over the
meetings of the council of ministers, suggesting a more activist stance than the interim
president who preceded him, Henrique Pereira Rosa, took. Nevertheless, there are also
speculations that Gomes Júnior and the PAIGC took their time to accept the results from
the presidential elections to gain political concessions from Vieira—in terms of promises
of ministerial posts in a likely new government—and ﬁnancial concessions from some of
Vieira’s external backers.15
Despite the president’s pledges to adhere to and build national unity, this ﬁerce com-
petition over power reﬂects a lack of unity between the different political groups in the coun-
try. Political power in Guinea-Bissau is concentrated in an executive subject to limited
checks and balances from weak democratic institutions. The state also retains main control
over access to the majority of resources in the country. As a result, the stakes are high for the
presidency and key political positions, undermining efforts at building national unity in
a country with more than 20 different ethnic groups, widespread poverty, and great dis-
parities between people. The lack of mechanisms for social and political accountability and
representation extending beyond the capital of Bissau to the regions where the majority of
the population resides further exacerbates this problem.
There is still a concern that the military, which has played a central role in the conﬂicts
and political instability of the past, will continue to interfere (or be manipulated into inter-
fering) in national politics and civilian affairs. Despite recent pledges by Wai to abide by the
rule of law and the country’s elected civilian leaders, the evidence of past actions, including
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14. Comment by Chris Melville, analyst with Global Insight, in Menezes (2005).
15. Comment by Chris Melville, analyst with Global Insight, in Menezes (2005).
its role during the recent electoral campaign suggests that the military will continue to
remain a source of instability in the future. Indeed, while this has in the past been partly a
result of political manipulation of and equipping an inﬂated, unpaid army often sharing
popular discontent, conditions have not sufﬁciently changed to expect that the military
will refrain from intervening in the future. Moreover, the tense and volatile relationship
between civilian power and the military is at its roots merely a reﬂection of a much deeper
problem of governance.
Despite the recent elections, therefore, there is much to be done before Guinea-Bissau
will complete its postconﬂict transition. Perhaps most importantly, the state continues to
lack legitimacy and credibility amongst most members of the population. This is because
of a variety of factors, especially its continued inability to provide basic services and infra-
structure, particularly outside of the capital of Bissau, and the perceived persistence of cor-
ruption and mismanagement in the public sector. This contributes to a history of weak
citizen-state relations, dating back to colonial times (Forrest 2003, Lourenço-Lindell 2002).
Moreover, while political freedom/rights ratings have improved over the last decade since
the process of political liberalization and transition to multiparty democratic politics in the
early 1990s,16 other estimates of governance have either worsened or largely remained the
same (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005), suggesting that the lack of government
capacity and credibility—unless addressed by the new administration—will continue to
pose a principal risk factor and source of potential instabilities in the future.
Household Perceptions: Results from a Recent Survey
Subjective Perceptions of Well-Being
Recent data on the perceptions of the population regarding the security situation and their
institutions are available from a small-scale survey conducted in 2005 for the Integrated
Poverty and Social Analysis (IPSA) report on Guinea-Bissau by the World Bank (2006).
The survey was conducted in both urban and rural areas, with about 400 households par-
ticipating. In this section, our objective is to present the results on the perception of the
population of the quality of life and the extent to which it trusts institutions within the
country. Table 3.2 provides data on the level of conﬁdence that household heads have in
various types of organizations. An assets index classiﬁes the households according to their
level of wealth.
The main variables used to create the index include variables related to the dwelling of
the household (home ownership, number of rooms, number of bedrooms, type of toilet
facility, principal source of water, principal source of energy for cooking, roof material, and
wall material), various types of assets (generator, battery, gas or electrical stove, traditional
stove, refrigerator, bed, mattress, mat, suitcase, television set, radio, cell phone, bicycle,
motorbike, car, canoe, outboard motor for canoe, and various other types of furniture),
productive assets (this included ﬁshing tools, rice cleaners, cashew presses, tools to work
the soil, and sewing machines), and various types of livestock. On the basis of this wealth
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index, households were ranked in three terciles. The poorest households are in the ﬁrst ter-
cile and the richest are in the third, with each of the three terciles accounting for one third
of the households. Roughly speaking, the ﬁrst tercile can be seen as representing the very
poor, while the bottom two terciles account for the poor.
Table 3.2 also provides data on subjective perceptions of welfare in the sample. Clearly,
an overwhelming majority of households declare that they are worse off today compared
to before the war, with few variations between terciles. In addition, a majority also believes
that they are worse off today than one year ago, but here the proportion is especially high
among the poor or extreme poor. This suggests that the continuous state of instability may
be more detrimental for poorer than wealthier households. The last four items in Table 3.2
are measures of subjective poverty and information on the number of meals per day,
whether households feel that they are lacking food, and if they do, when this occurs. These
data suggest that those classiﬁed in the bottom terciles see themselves as comparatively
poorer than households in the top tercile; they have fewer meals per day on average, and
they are also more likely to lack food (this affects a very large share of the poor), especially
during the rainy season.
Role of Social Networks17
The data in Table 3.2 suggest that there is a high degree of poverty and vulnerability in
Guinea-Bissau. Yet social networks often seem to provide crucial sources of support for
poor households, particularly during times of stress and coping. Indeed the resilience of
the population in the face of hardship could probably not be explained if it had not been
for the minimal protection offered to many households by “safety nets” that poor house-
holds build (Lourenço-Lindell 2002). Nevertheless, it is important not to romanticize the
notion and capacity of social networks to sustain poor households. The poorest of the poor
are sometimes excluded from such networks—social assets, like other assets, may be resources
they do not have access to. Other networks are based on hierarchical and nonegalitarian
patron-client relations that while providing some source of security to the poorer client,
the relationship may still be abusive. Hence, social networks are not necessarily a panacea
to solve the welfare problems of the poor.
In Guinea-Bissau there exist a range of social networks, the most common of which
are those based on kinship and family, village-membership, religion, and neighborhood
ties. Lourenço-Lindell (2002) noted that the networks differ in terms of their durability,
the types of claims that can be made, and in terms of the power balance that they appear
to exhibit (kin and market-based, instrumental and altruistic, hierarchical and egalitarian,
and so on). Kinship ties are often important sources of food and money, both for con-
sumption purposes as well as for market activities. Neighbors in urban areas living within
the same house or compound provide a similar role. Also in urban areas, relations of assis-
tance develop at the market place in a variety of ways. There were partnerships between
sellers in the same trade who assist each other, sometimes pooling resources and contacts.
Some traders count on credit from suppliers. Abotas, the rotating savings groups referred
to earlier, is another key resource. Another kind of cooperation consisted of organized
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Source: Authors’ estimation from 2005 IPSA survey.
Tercile Area
1 2 3 Urban Rural Total
Change in well-being versus before the war
Got better 14.18 12.06 15.79 12.18 15.06 13.98
Same 9.22 9.93 7.52 7.05 10.04 8.92
Got worse 75.89 77.30 76.69 80.77 74.13 76.63
Not applicable 0.71 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.48
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Change in well-being versus last year
Got better 28.47 27.66 40.14 33.73 31.03 32.08
Same 18.06 15.60 9.86 10.84 16.86 14.52
Got worse 53.47 56.74 50.00 55.42 52.11 53.40
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Household situation versus community
Very poor 33.83 29.69 16.92 23.33 29.05 26.85
Poor 4.51 3.13 4.62 4.00 4.15 4.09
Medium 45.11 57.03 50.77 50.67 51.04 50.90
Rich 15.79 9.38 26.92 21.33 14.94 17.39
The most rich 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.67 0.83 0.77
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
How many meals do you take in a day?
One 43.97 29.41 26.09 25.31 38.34 33.25
Two 37.59 43.38 44.20 46.30 38.74 41.69
Three or more 18.44 27.21 29.71 28.40 22.92 25.06
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Lack of food
Yes 93.71 95.74 73.24 79.52 92.69 87.56
No 6.29 4.26 26.76 20.48 7.31 12.44
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
If lack of food, when?
End of dry season 0.00 4.51 2.00 1.57 2.52 2.19
Rainy season 60.61 55.64 45.00 42.52 60.92 54.52
Beginning of rainy season 7.58 6.77 5.00 2.36 8.82 6.58
Beginning and end of rainy season 3.03 0.75 11.00 8.66 2.10 4.38
Dry season 7.58 8.27 8.00 8.66 7.56 7.95
Rainy season and dry season 3.79 0.75 1.00 1.57 2.10 1.92
Others/nonresponse 1.52 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.84 0.82
All the time 15.91 23.31 27.00 33.86 15.13 21.64
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 3.2 Subjective Perceptions of Well-Being, 2005
groups among day workers (surni), where men share job opportunities and redistribute
incomes. At the village level, there has been a revival of traditional social clubs (mand-
juandades), during the last two decades that provide recreational and some level of eco-
nomic assistance to their members. These informal, communal groups, which may include
both women and men, are structured according to age. Within a tabanca, a new group is
established about every three years, and is often named after the major event occurring in
the tabanca that year. In Caió, the groups go under the name uran; the latest group was
established there in 2004 and is called uran telemobel, since this was the year cell phones
became popular in Guinea-Bissau. Finally, some households participate in local religious
groupings—Catholic, Evangelical, and Islamic congregations. Some of these, however,
may be more important in terms of providing personal acquaintances and contacts for
cooperation in other social settings, such as the market, than in terms of the volume of
material assistance they provide to needy members.
Individual or household vulnerability, therefore, is partly a reﬂection of which com-
binations or types of social networks—if any—one has access to. Indeed, households and
individuals vary in their access to social networks and are therefore not equally protected
against shocks and unexpected events. The more vulnerable individuals and groups are
those that are more isolated, with a very small number of sources that they can rely on for
assistance. Secondly, many households or individuals also do not seem to be in a position
to combine different sorts of these “safety nets.” Some remain reliant on one type of net-
work, seemingly unable to select those networks they prefer and to break free from those
they deem oppressive and disadvantageous.
This vulnerability may also be exacerbated during periods of general economic
downturn—the time when social assistance is often needed the most. Economic hardship
seems to erode the collaborative efforts among the poor as well as the material basis of their
support networks. As a result, many are forced to rely on their own resources, as they per-
ceive other members of their networks as being as bad off as they are. The redistribution
of groups among casual workers, for example, have over the last couple of years become
less and less reliable, because of a continued inﬂux of unemployed youth into the labor mar-
ket, a reduction in employment opportunities, and declining incomes. In a situation of
increasing impoverishment, the assistance provided by religious groups is also put under
pressure. And, as noted earlier, participation in the abotas also becomes difﬁcult for those
unable to comply with regular contributions in times of uncertain and irregular incomes.
As such, it may seem that those that rely exclusively on market-based networks—while
having more flexibility and choice—may end up being more vulnerable than those that
also, or even only, have access to kinship-based sources of support, which may be more
tolerant of the inability to reciprocate during long periods of time. Given this, it would
be worth asking the question of whether it may be likely that those who through their
social status had limited access to productive resources—single, widowed, or abandoned
women, (unmarried youth) and nonnative migrants—may also have lesser access to 
kinship-based networks.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is a high level of inequality in Guinea-Bissau. This
inequality, as well as to some extent diversity itself, are likely to undermine the formation
or maintenance of social capital. The country comprises some 20 different ethnic groups,
underscoring the fact that social capital formation may not always be durable and sustain-
able, particularly in urban settings where inequality and diversity is at greater display. Yet
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at the same time, it is not possible to associate inequality with any one particular issue. In
fact, when asked about potential sources of inequality in the country, households men-
tioned that religion, age, and gender were more important factors at the source of existing
inequalities than ethnicity. Geographic location played a less important role in the mindset
of the population, even though it can be demonstrated that it actually plays an important
role in explaining differences in well-being between households.
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Tercile Area
1 2 3 Urban Rural Total
Ethnicity
A lot 4.65 7.41 14.39 14.10 5.42 8.84
A little 25.58 31.11 34.85 35.90 27.08 30.56
No 69.77 61.48 50.76 50.00 67.50 60.61
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Religion
A lot 13.99 12.86 34.31 31.87 13.08 20.24
A little 25.17 28.57 22.63 21.88 27.69 25.48
No 60.84 58.57 43.07 46.25 59.23 54.29
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Age
A lot 35.11 19.26 26.52 21.15 30.58 26.88
A little 14.50 22.22 30.30 30.77 16.94 22.36
No 50.38 58.52 43.18 48.08 52.48 50.75
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Gender
A lot 10.85 14.81 20.74 20.63 12.13 15.54
A little 34.11 25.93 36.30 32.50 31.80 32.08
No 55.04 59.26 42.96 46.88 56.07 52.38
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Geographic location
A lot 3.88 10.53 16.79 18.83 5.02 10.43
A little 34.11 27.07 32.82 31.82 30.96 31.30
No 62.02 62.41 50.38 49.35 64.02 58.27
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 3.3 Factors Contributing to Inequality in 2005
Source: Authors’ estimation from 2005 IPSA survey.
Trust in Different Institutions
The 2005 IPSA survey also provided data on public perceptions of different institutions
and conﬁrmed that local-level institutions are more trustworthy than central or local gov-
ernments, the military, or political parties. While we do not know the level of trust of various
institutions, the data enables us to test which institutions beneﬁt from the highest level of
trust among households. Table 3.4 shows that local schools and health posts are perceived
as the most trustworthy institutions. This trust is explained by the services provided by
these institutions and the level of participation that the community has in parent associa-
tions and health-post teams. This trust appears to be particularly strong in rural areas,
where the local school and the health post are the only institutions that are present and
have some legitimacy for the community. The judiciary, the police, religious organizations,
and traditional authorities have much lower levels of trust. Note that there are differences
between terciles. Among the poor, trust in local institutions dealing with education and
health as well as religious issues is even stronger, relatively speaking (that is, as compared
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Tercile Area
1 2 3 Urban Rural Total
First-most trusted organization (%)
Religious organizations 12.21 5.65 9.30 8.78 9.32 9.11
Political parties 1.53 0.00 1.55 1.35 0.85 1.04
Local government 0.00 1.61 5.43 4.73 0.85 2.34
NGOs 6.87 0.00 17.83 15.54 3.81 8.33
Traditional authorities 2.29 4.03 1.55 0.00 4.24 2.60
Schools 42.75 37.10 31.01 31.76 40.25 36.98
Health centers 29.01 43.55 26.36 31.08 33.90 32.81
Army 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.26
Police 2.29 1.61 0.78 0.68 2.12 1.56
Justice 0.76 4.84 6.20 4.73 3.39 3.91
Central government 1.53 1.61 0.00 0.68 1.27 1.04
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Second-most trusted organization (%)
Religious organizations 7.27 3.54 13.40 11.50 5.80 7.81
Political parties 1.82 0.88 4.12 1.77 2.42 2.19
Local government 1.82 2.65 4.12 4.42 1.93 2.81
NGOs 0.91 0.88 6.19 4.42 1.45 2.50
Traditional authorities 6.36 5.31 2.06 0.88 6.76 4.69
Schools 30.00 38.94 23.71 28.32 32.85 31.25
Health centers 45.45 35.40 36.08 36.28 40.58 39.06
Army 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.63
Police 3.64 5.31 5.15 7.08 3.38 4.69
Justice 0.00 6.19 4.12 5.31 2.42 3.44
Central government 0.91 0.88 1.03 0.00 1.45 0.94
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 3.4 The Institutions Most Trusted by Citizens, 2005
Source: Authors’ estimation from 2005 IPSA survey.
to trust in other institutions), than among the better off. Indeed, at least some of the better
off tend to have higher levels of trust than the very poor in NGOs, the justice system, and
the local government. In all three terciles, very few ﬁnd that the police, the army, political
parties, and the central government are very trustworthy.
Note that there are also some differences between urban and rural areas. For exam-
ple, trust in traditional authorities is higher among the rural population, while trust in
NGOs is more prevalent among urban dwellers. It is interesting to highlight these dif-
ferences because they are related to the different roles these institutions have. In urban
settings, trust in NGOs appears to be related to the role NGOs have in service delivery
and access to goods and services (such as concession of credit to members and so on).
Trust in traditional authorities, while higher in rural areas, is still low. This is partly
explained by the fact that traditional authorities are perceived as controlling access to
information and mediating the relationship with outsiders. At the same time, in rural
as well as urban settings, there are multiple local community-based organizations that
inspire trust and encourage people to participate and engage in activities that play an
important role in the survival of the community and its families.
Security, Sources of Conﬂict at the Local Level, and the Issue of Land
Table 3.5 provides data on perceptions regarding changes in the security situation and
sources of conﬂicts at the local level. Only half of the households consider that the security
situation has improved over the last year and that the share of the population that believes
that the situation has deteriorated is higher among the bottom tercile. Data on the sources
of local conﬂicts are also revealing. In a country such as Guinea-Bissau, which has experi-
enced a great deal of population movements across the whole subregion over centuries and
recently was engaged in a civil war that led to the displacement of thousands of people,
there is a risk that segments of the population end up in situations with limited access to
productive resources, and hence, in a state of poverty and vulnerability. This also means
that competition for productive resources will be important, and indeed, Table 3.5 sug-
gests that apart from internal family issues, most local conﬂict situations seem to arise from
issues related to land, water, and livestock, especially in rural areas. Table 3.5 also shows
that very poor and poor households tend to rely mostly on traditional authorities to solve
conﬂicts, while the better off rely more on the police.
Chapter 5 will discuss issues related to the livelihoods of the population across the
country’s regions. Here, it is worth discussing in more detail the issue of land. In fact,
although this cannot be tested here, in many cases, issues related to access to land and
other productive resources involve a family component because of differences in access
between genders. Specifically, access to land and labor in Guinea-Bissau, like in most
other African countries, requires membership in social institutions, in particular
autochthonous kinship and domestic groups.18 Critical productive resources are vested
within these groups, and, in most cases, these resources are principally controlled by
senior men. Marriage is the foundation of these groups and is the institution through
which men are allocated land. Women gain use rights over land through the land allo-
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18. Autochthonous groups refer to those descended from the original founders of the community.
cated to their husbands.19 They are also primarily able to call upon and mobilize labor
through the institution of marriage.
Unmarried women or women in female-headed households, unmarried male youth,
and “outsiders”—that is, those that have not descended from the community founders—
are also restricted in their access to productive resources. The access to productive
resources and participation in social life by nonautochthones depends on the acceptance
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Tercile Area
1 2 3 Urban Rural Total
Change in security situation (%)
Improvement 45.83 42.25 57.75 54.82 44.66 48.60
No difference 9.72 11.97 11.27 12.65 9.92 10.98
Deterioration 42.36 44.37 30.28 31.33 43.89 39.02
No data 2.08 1.41 0.70 1.20 1.53 1.40
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources of conﬂict (%)
Land 14.60 21.8 17.42 18.95 17.27 17.91
Water 14.60 13.53 16.67 9.15 18.47 14.93
Family 20.44 12.03 32.58 31.37 15.66 21.64
Livestock 34.31 27.07 17.42 18.95 30.92 26.37
Fishing 0.00 1.50 2.27 1.96 0.80 1.24
Extraction activities 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.65 0.00 0.25
Participation to community live 1.46 1.50 7.58 8.50 0.40 3.48
Religion 0.73 1.50 0.00 0.65 0.80 0.75
Wealth 0.73 1.50 0.00 1.31 0.40 0.75
Others 13.14 19.55 5.31 8.49 15.26 12.69
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Whom do you turn to in case of conﬂict?
Police 23.57 15.33 64.54 64.24 15.42 34.69
Traditional authority 56.43 52.55 17.73 20.00 56.52 42.11
Police and traditional authority 9.29 3.65 5.67 3.64 7.91 6.22
Family 5.00 16.79 4.26 3.64 11.86 8.61
Others 5.71 11.68 7.80 8.48 8.29 8.37
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 3.5 Perceptions of the Security Situation and Sources of Conﬂict, 2005
Source: Authors’ estimation from 2005 IPSA survey.
19. In rare cases, women can also own land in their own right. Widowed women might inherit land
in trust for their sons, which is then allocated to the sons upon marriage. Women who are single or
divorced and widows who have lost all their sons may be forced to return to their families and might be
given a small area to farm. Some widowed or otherwise single women have to negotiate access to land
every season.
and goodwill of senior, male “patron” autochthones—frequently, the Chefe de Tabanca—
and normally can only occur by marrying into a local autochthonous family. The “client”
outsider would be expected to return the favor in a number of ways, although these rela-
tionships are never equal and work in favor of the more powerful patron who has greater
bargaining power. Field work carried for this study picked up on the problem of access
to land by nonnatives (nonautochthones)—including immigrants from the Casamance
region of Senegal to the north of the country and migrants internal to Guinea-Bissau,
who as a result were either left without the ability to farm (in some cases) or gained 
limited and conditional access to land. Those that gained access to land often had to
abide by a set of conditions, such as being limited to cultivating rice, corn, or cassava,
and not being allowed to use the land for fruit and cashew plantations. Access rights were
also only temporary, meaning that nonnative households had to renegotiate the access
to and use of land on an annual basis. Land received was also often of lesser quality,
which in some parts of the country (for example, the less fertile east) can mean chronic
food shortages.
Women’s access to land and other productive resources was also seen to be affected by
this (see Box 3.1). As women only gain access to land through their husbands, which cre-
ates a certain level of dependency of women on men, women who had been abandoned,
divorced, or widowed would in some cases ﬁnd themselves without access to land. While
women were, in most cases, still provided with land, though mainly on a temporary basis,
the more serious problem in these cases was their access to and ability to mobilize labor to
help work and cultivate the land. The extent of this problem seemed to vary according to
ethnicity and religion, with women in the east seeming to be left more vulnerable if single,
widowed, or abandoned than in other areas. Anecdotal evidence suggesting an increase in
the abandonment of women because of their reported enhanced income-earning status
provides a cause for concern.
The issue of access to land is of immediate importance given the current national and
legislative debate on reforming land access policies. A new land law was adopted in 1998,
but the regulations required to implement the law are still under discussion. While the new
law makes a grand leap forward in recognizing traditional authorities’ role in managing
and distributing communal land, the discussion here underscores the importance of also
addressing the speciﬁc needs of women, youth, and migrants in accessing land. Moreover,
the regulations also need to take seriously the many latent yet intensifying conﬂicts over
access to land, particularly those between livestock breeders and agriculturalists as well as
between traditional communities and private investors (including ponteiros). Conﬂicts over
land in urban areas are also becoming more serious, most of which have been between
urban settlers and the Municipal Council of Bissau (CMB). The CMB has taken on the
responsibility of managing land in Bissau and claims ownership of much of the land that
is currently being inhabited by poor dwellers, particularly in the outskirts of the city of Bis-
sau. The local government has also encroached extensively on customary land in Bissau
and nearby Biombo, literally expropriating the Pepel (native owners of these lands) of large
shares of their land. An area in Alto Bandim, for example, which was originally used by local
farmers for cashew production, but which was expropriated by the municipal government
without any compensation and later sold to private persons or turned into luxury res-
idences, is the recently built Ministers’ Quarters on Alto Bandim (Lourenço-Lindell 2002).
Perhaps most importantly, efforts need to be made to ensure the implementation capacity
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Box 3.1 Land Regulation in Guinea-Bissau—A Review
Under colonial administration, two types of property rights had been conceptualized under
Decree 43893 of 1961: the land right of the state and that of the communities called reserved
areas. The reserved areas had covered areas actually under cultivation and residential areas,
yet excluded the areas under fallow and extraction activities (ﬁshing and forestry). The Land
Law 4/75 adopted after the independence in 1975 transferred land property to the state. The
new Land Law (Law No. 5/98) adopted in 1998 articulated three objectives: (1) guarantee land
rights to local communities for economic use; (2) acknowledge customary land regime by rep-
resentative institutions; and (3) stimulate land investment by creating market value.
Contrary to the previous legislation, the new law has authorized and introduced permanent
or temporary land concessions both in urban and rural areas. In addition, the law has cre-
ated a tax mechanism to increase land-use efﬁciency aimed at dismantling large-scale farms
(latifundios) unable to demonstrate income generating capacities. It has also permitted the
formation of an administration commission of land whose objective is to safeguard the law
enforcement and consorted interventions in land use. The land in Guinea-Bissau has been
declared a property of the state constituting a common property of all the people (Article 20,
Section 1). Yet, all citizens have a right to private use of land, and the state can grant the right
of private use to individuals and collective units and national and foreign entity for economic
and social development objectives (Article 40, Section 1). Such land rights for private use are
recognized either by: (1) customary use (uso consuetudinário), as envisaged land use by tradi-
tional local communities, and (2) concession (Article 40, Section 3). The present law therefore
recognizes land-use rights based on customary use practiced by traditional local communities.
This is an important instrument to recognize and guarantee traditional rights in a modern
legislation context.
The private land use right under customary use is a permanent title and can be exercised in
rural and urban land including reserved areas for local communities (Article 16). The land
under the customary use covers cultivated and inhabited zones as well as unexplored zones
and resources attributed to local community residents through their representatives. The
administration and distribution of the land under customary use by the local community res-
idents shall be exercised according to the custom and practices of each community, and any
omitted part shall be governed by this law (Article 17, Section 1, 2). The law clearly stipulates
in Article 17, Section 3, that the state recognizes the residents’ right for community admin-
istration and exploration of the land, forest, and other natural resources according to local
custom and practices. The private land-use right under customary use is guaranteed by the
state independent of written contract or register, obliging the land commission to promote and
constantly update the registration services (Article 17, Section 4). This right shall be transferred
by successive inheritance and transferable to other resident(s) within the local community
free of charge, according to the local practices independent of endorsement by contract and
register (Article 18).
Transfer of the private land-use right under customary use to the third party, other than those
referred to in Article 18, shall be made in agreement with the state and the local communi-
ties and follow the process to be applied in the concession. In such cases, the population of
the local communities retains the right to freely and directly negotiate the terms of transfer
in accordance with the conditions speciﬁed in Article 23 (Article 19). The private land-use
right under customary use can be converted into the private land-use right under concession
(Article 21). The private land-use right under concession is granted by administrative contract
and has a duration of 90 years to be automatically renewed if not revoked (Article 22). This
right is transferable by contract or inheritance upon request for ofﬁcial authorization. The
process of grant, transfer of, and conversion into the private land-use right under concession
involves tax obligations and the right is subject to annual land tax payment (Article 38). The
land tax revenues shall be distributed in the following manner; (1) 60 percent to the public
treasury, (2) 20 percent to local communities, (3) 10 percent to regional and sectoral admin-
istrative authorities, and (4) 10 percent to the Land Commissions.
Source: World Bank (2006).
of the new law and its regulations, without which the land law will have little impact on
the ground.
Note ﬁnally that while this is not apparent in Table 3.4, the importance of accessing
labor is also an acute concern. The availability of labor in rural areas seems to be decreasing.
Field work documented a so-called “rural exodus,” primarily of youth escaping rural areas
in search of further education and better life opportunities in urban towns and cities. In
addition to the thousands of uneducated youth it adds to the informal and unemployed labor
market in Bissau, this exodus leaves rural areas without the productive capacity required
to farm the lands and ensure sustainable rural livelihoods. Again, however, households
with large proportions of elderly and female members are at a particular disadvantage.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided results from a recent small-scale household survey on changes in
citizens’ well-being over time, their trust in various local and national authorities, sources
of conﬂicts at the local level, and the ways with which citizens deal with these conﬂicts.
There is a clear perception among the population that its well-being has deteriorated as a
result of the 1998 conﬂict as well as an increase in violence and lack of security even after
the conﬂict, with no clear sign of improvement. The population has little trust in national
institutions, such as the army, the police, the judicial system, and the central government.
The results also suggest that local conﬂicts often emerge because of the competition for
scarce productive resources, but poorer households deal with these conﬂicts in a different
way than wealthier households.
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